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An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint
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An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint
sets of objects. An illustration of such a two-sided market is, for example, the housing
market. In this situation one set of objects is a collection of houses, where diﬀerent houses
are owned by diﬀerent agents (the group of sellers). The other set of objects is a collection
of agents where each agent wants to buy exactly one house (the group of buyers). Shapley
and Shubik (1972) introduced assignment games, a class of cooperative games, in order to
analyze these assignment situations. They showed that these games have a non-empty core.
Quint (1991) showed that the core of assignment games have a lattice structure. Solymosi
and Raghavan (1994, 2001) provided a polynomial algorithm for the nucleolus of assignment
games and provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for stability of the core. Hamers et
al. (2002) proved that all extreme points of the core are marginal vectors, in spite of the
fact that assignment games need not be convex. N´ u˜ nez and Rafels (2003) characterize the
extreme points of assignment games by means of the reduced marginal worth vectors.
This paper analyzes assignment situations in which an object can be owned by several
agents and where agents can participate in the ownership of more than one object. We will
refer to these assignment situations as assignment situations with multiple ownership, AMO
for short. An AMO is described by two disjoint sets of agents, two disjoint sets of objects and
the description of which agent(s) own(s) which objects. If an object of one set is assigned
to an object of the other set there will be some reward. This reward will be described using
a reward matrix. Similar to Shapley and Shubik (1972) we deﬁne simple assignment games,
a class of cooperative games arising from an AMO and a non-negative reward matrix. In a
simple assignment game each coalition can only match objects that are completely owned
by this coalition. Moreover, if a player is participating in the ownership of more than one
object, at most one of these objects can be matched. In the relaxations of simple assignment
games this last restriction is relaxed, i.e. if a player is participating in more than one object,
at most two (three, ..., etc.) of these objects can be matched.
The house market is still a nice example of this model. The properties of the sellers
can be apartment buildings or shopping malls which usually are owned by several agents.
Moreover, it can be that some agents are involved in the ownership of several apartment
buildings or shopping malls. The buyers can be viewed as a group of investors which are
1interested in apartment buildings or shopping malls. Obviously, one investor can be member
of more than one investor group. The possible restrictions on the number of apartment
buildings or shopping malls that can be sold or bought can be imposed by governmental
rules, for example, to resist monopolies in city areas of owners of apartments or shopping
malls.
We call an AMO balanced if for any choice of the non-negative reward matrix the cor-
responding simple assignment game is balanced. We will characterize balanced AMO by
requiring a structure on the ownership of the objects by the agents. This line of research has
been applied by Herer and Penn (1995) and Granot et al. (1999) to characterize submodu-
lar and balanced graphs with respect to traveling salesman problems and Chinese postman
problems, respectively. Finally, we will study relaxations of simple assignment games and
provide suﬃcient conditions for non-emptiness of the core.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce formally the AMO’s and the
corresponding simple assignment games. Section 3 is devoted to balanced AMO’s. Finally,
in Section 4 we provide a suﬃcient condition for balancedness of the relaxations of simple
assignment games by formulating these games as Integer Linear Programming problems.
2 The assignment model and its game
In this section we introduce assignment situations with multiple ownership and its corre-
sponding games.
An assignment situation with multiple ownership ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)), for short
AMO, consists of two ﬁnite and disjoint agent (player) sets M1 and M2, two ﬁnite and
disjoint sets of objects A1 and A2 and functions Si : Ai → 2Mi, i ∈{ 1,2}, that describe
the set of agents that own some object. Speciﬁcally, for object a ∈ Ai the set Si(a)i st h e
subset of agents in Mi that own object a. It is assumed that ∪a∈AiSi(a)=Mi for i =1 ,2
and Si(a)  = ∅ for any a ∈ Ai and i =1 ,2. These assumptions imply that each agent of Mi
is involved in the ownership of at least one object of Ai and that each object is owned by at
least one agent. Observe that it is not excluded that agents are involved in the ownership
of more than one object. If an object of A1 is matched with an object of A2,t h e r ec a nb e
obtained some reward. A non-negative matrix R ∈ IR A1×A2 expresses this reward. So, if
2object a ∈ A1 is assigned to object b ∈ A2, then the reward is equal to Rab ≥ 0. Observe
that the assignment situations as discussed in Shapley and Shubik (1972) can be seen as a
special class of AMO’s with a reward matrix.
Now, we follow the same line as in Shapley and Shubik (1972) to deﬁne a simple as-
signment game that arises from an AMO. Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO. Let
Ti ⊂ Mi, i ∈{ 1,2}, be two coalitions and let Bi(Ti)={a ∈ Ai | Si(a) ⊂ Ti} be the objects
that are completely owned by the members of coalition Ti. A matching µ for T1∪T2 consists
of pairwise disjoint pairs in B1(T1) × B2(T2). Hence, for a coalition T1 ∪ T2 the deﬁnition of
a matching implies that we can only assign objects that are completely owned by members
of coalition T1 ∪ T2 and each of these objects is assigned to at most one other object. A
matching µ is called admissible if for any two distinct pairs (a1,b 1),(a2,b 2) ∈ µ it holds
S1(a1)∩S1(a2)=∅ and S2(b1)∩S2(b2)=∅. The restriction to admissible matchings implies
that for each player at most one object is matched where he is participating in. The set of
admissible matchings with respect to coalition T1 ∪ T2 is denoted by A(T1 ∪ T2).
Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO and R a non-negative reward matrix. The
corresponding simple assignment game (M1 ∪ M2,v) is deﬁned for all T1 ⊂ M1,T 2 ⊂ M2 by
v(T1 ∪ T2)=m a x {
 
(a,b)∈µ
Rab : µ ∈A (T1 ∪ T2)}, (1)
i.e. the worth of a coalition is the maximum value of an admissible matching for this coalition.
Observe that v(T1 ∪ T2)=w(B1(T1) ∪ B2(T2)) where (A1 ∪ A2,w) is the assignment game
as deﬁned in Shapley and Shubik (1972), arising from the situation (A1,A 2,R)i nw h i c ht h e
agents are identiﬁed with the objects.
The following example illustrates an AMO and its corresponding game. Moveover, this
example shows that the core of a simple assignment game can be empty. The core of a
cooperative game (N,v) is deﬁned by
Core(v)={x ∈ IR
N | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N,x(N)=v(N)},
where x(S)=
 
i∈S xi. Hence, if x ∈ Core(v), then no coalition in S ⊂ N has an incentive
to split oﬀ from the grand coalition if x is the proposed vector of revenue shares. A game
(N,v)i sbalanced if it has a non-empty core.
3Example 2.1 Figure 1 displays an AMO ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) with reward matrix
R. The rows and columns of R represent the objects of A1 and A2, respectively. The players
owning an object are printed bold behind the rows and above the columns. For example,









Figure 1: An AMO with reward matrix R.
Let (M1 ∪ M2,v) be the corresponding game. An example of an admissible matching
of {1,2,3,4} is {(r1,c 1),(r2,c 3)},w h e r e( r1,c 1)((r2,c 3)) reﬂects the matching of the ob-
jects in row 1 (2) and column 1 (3). This matching yields a reward of 2. The matching
{(r1,c 1),(r2,c 2)} is inadmissible because player 3 is participating in the ownership of c1 and
c2 and we assumed that each player could be matched at most once. It is straightforward to
check that v({1,2,3,4})=2 ,v({1,2,4})=2 ,v({1,3,4})=2a n dv({2,3}) = 1. It follows
that this simple assignment game has an empty core, because if (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4) ∈ Core(v),
then
4=2 ( x1 + x2 + x3 + x4)
=( x1 + x2 + x4)+( x1 + x3 + x4)+( x2 + x3)
≥ v({1,2,4})+v({1,3,4})+v({2,3})
= 2+2+1=5 ,
which is a contradiction. 
In the following sections balancedness of simple assignment games and its relaxations
will be studied.
3 Balanced assignment situations with multiple own-
ership
In this section we provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for balancedness of AMO’s.
4An AMO is called balanced if for any reward matrix R the corresponding simple assign-
ment game is balanced.
First, we show that for AMO’s in which each agent (player) is participating in one object,
are balanced.
Proposition 3.1 An AMO in which each agent is participating in precisely one object is
balanced.
Proof: Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO that satisﬁes S1(a)∩S1(ˆ a)=∅ for all
a,ˆ a ∈ A1,a =ˆ a and S1(b)∩S1(ˆ b)=∅ for all b,ˆ b ∈ A2,b = ˆ b.L e tR be a non-negative reward
matrix. Now, we have to show that the corresponding simple assignment game (M1∪M2,v)
is balanced. Let (A1 ∪ A2,w) be the assignment game, as deﬁned in Shapley and Shubik
(1972), arising from the situation (A1,A 2,R) in which the agents are identiﬁed with the
objects. Because assignment games are balanced there exists a vector (uA1,vA2) ∈ Core(w),
where uA1 (resp. vA2) represents the payoﬀ of the players in A1 (resp. A2). Note that
uA1 ≥ 0a n dvA2 ≥ 0. Let x ∈ IR M1∪M2 be deﬁned as follows:




with a ∈ A1 such that i ∈ S1(a)





with b ∈ A2 such that j ∈ S2(b)





















































≥ w(B1(T1) ∪ B2(T2))
= v(T1 ∪ T2).
Observe that the ﬁrst inequality holds since uA1 ≥ 0a n dvA2 ≥ 0, the second inequality holds
since (uA1,vA2) ∈ Core(w). Moreover, for the grand coalition all inequalities are equalities,
i.e., x(M1 ∪ M2)=v(M1 ∪ M2), which completes the proof. 
5Next, we will deﬁne two properties that fully characterize balanced AMO’s.
An AMO ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) satisﬁes the partitioning property if for all i ∈




i } of Ai that satisﬁes the following two condi-
tions:




Si(a)  = ∅,



















The ﬁrst condition states that there is at least one player participating in each object of
a partition element. The second condition states that player sets corresponding to two dif-
ferent partition elements have no player in common. Observe, that AMO’s where each player
is participating in precisely one object satisﬁes the partitioning property. We illustrate an
AMO that satisﬁes the partitioning property in the following example.
Example 3.2 Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO such that
M1 = {1,2,3,4,5}, M2 = {6,7,8,9}, A1 = {a1,a 2,a 3},A 2 = {b1,b 2,b 3}, S1(a1)={1,2},
S1(a2)={1,3},S 1(a3)={4,5},S 2(b1)={6,7},S 2(b2)={7,8},S 2(b3)={9}.T a k i n g t h e
partitions A1
1 = {a1,a 2},A 2
1 = {a3} and A1
2 = {b1,b 2},A 2
2 = {b3}, it is straightforward to
verify that this AMO satisﬁes the partitioning property. 
An AMO ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) satisﬁes the intersection property if
 
a∈A1
S1(a)  = ∅ or
 
b∈A2
S2(b)  = ∅. Hence, an AMO satisﬁes the intersection property if all row objects or all
column objects have at least one player in common. The following example illustrates the
intersection property.
Example 3.3 Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO such that
M1 = {1,2,3}, M2 = {4,5,6}, A1 = {a1,a 2,a 3},A 2 = {b1,b 2}, S1(a1)={1,2},




{5}  = ∅. Hence, this AMO satisﬁes the intersection property. 
Observe that the AMO of Example 3.2 does not satisfy the intersection property and the
AMO of Example 3.3 does not satisfy the partitioning property.
Now, we can formulate the characterization of balanced AMO’s.
6Theorem 3.4 An AMO is balanced if and only if it satisﬁes the partitioning property or
the intersection property.
Proof: First observe that if |A1| =1o r|A2| = 1 then trivially the intersection property
holds and for any reward function the corresponding simple assignment game is balanced.
Hence, we have to prove the theorem for |A1|≥2a n d|A2|≥2.
We ﬁrst prove the ”if”-part. Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO and let R be
a reward matrix. Let (M1 ∪ M2,v) be the corresponding simple assignment game. First
assume that ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) satisﬁes the partitioning property. Hence, for i ∈




i } that satisﬁes the conditions in the partitioning
property. From this AMO we create a new AMO that satisﬁes the condition of Proposition
3.1. First, we will merge the objects in one partition element to one object and these
merged objects will be owned by the intersection of the players that own the objects in the
partition element. Second, the reward between two new objects is the maximum reward
that can be achieved between two objects in the corresponding partition elements. Formally,






Si(a), ¯ Ai = {a1
i,...,a
ki





Si(a) for all i =1 ,2, r ∈{ 1,...,ki} .L e t¯ R










Rab for all r1 ∈{ 1,...,k1},r 2 ∈{ 1,...,k2}.L e t(¯ M1∪ ¯ M2,w)
be the game corresponding to the induced AMO and ¯ R. Because the induced AMO satisﬁes
the condition of Proposition 3.1, we have that Core(w)  = ∅.L e t¯ x ∈ Core(w) and deﬁne
x ∈ IR M1∪M2 as xi =¯ xi if i ∈ ¯ M1 ∪ ¯ M2 and xi = 0 otherwise. We show that x ∈ Core(v).
First observe that w(S)=v(S∪ ¯ M 
1∪ ¯ M 
2) for all S ⊂ ¯ M1∪ ¯ M2 with ¯ M 
i = Mi\ ¯ Mi,i∈{ 1,2}.
Then
x(M1 ∪ M2)=¯ x( ¯ M1 ∪ ¯ M2)
= w( ¯ M1 ∪ ¯ M2)
= v(M1 ∪ M2)
7and
x(S)=¯ x(S ∩ ( ¯ M1 ∪ ¯ M2))
≥ w(S ∩ ( ¯ M1 ∪ ¯ M2))
= v((S ∩ ( ¯ M1 ∪ ¯ M2)) ∪ ¯ M
 




for all S ⊂ M1∪M2. The ﬁrst inequality holds because ¯ x ∈ Core(w) and the second because
S ⊂ (S ∩ ( ¯ M1 ∪ ¯ M2)) ∪ ¯ M 
1 ∪ ¯ M 
2. Hence, x ∈ Core(v).
Secondly, assume that ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) satisﬁes the intersection property. With-
out loss of generality we assume that
 
a∈A1
S1(a)=B  = ∅.
Then v(S)=0i fB  S.A l s o v(S) ≤ maxa∈A1,b∈A2{Rab} if B ⊆ S and v(M1 ∪ M2)=
max
a∈A1,b∈A2
Rab. Deﬁne the vector x ∈ IR M1∪M2 by xi = v(M1 ∪M2)f o rs o m ei ∈ B and xj =0 ,
j  = i, otherwise. It is straightforward to check that x ∈ Core(v).
Second we prove the ”only if”-part. We show that if an AMO does not satisfy the partition
property and the intersection property, then it is not balanced. Assume that






S2(b)=∅. We distinguish between two cases:
(i) For all a1,a 2 ∈ A1 holds S1(a1) ∩ S1(a2)  = ∅,o r
for all b1,b 2 ∈ A2 holds S2(b1) ∩ S2(b2)  = ∅,
(ii) There exists a1,a 2 ∈ A1 with S1(a1) ∩ S1(a2)=∅,a n d
there exists b1,b 2 ∈ A2 with S2(b1) ∩ S2(b2)=∅.
Assume that (i) holds. Without loss of generality assume that S1(a1) ∩ S1(a2)  = ∅ for
all a1,a 2 ∈ A1. Then take the reward matrix R in which every entry is equal to 1. Let
(M1 ∪ M2,v) be the simple assignment game corresponding to ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2))
and R. Since the intersection of the player sets of any two objects in A1 is not empty, at most
one object of A1 can be assigned to an object of A2. Hence, it follows that v(M1 ∪ M2)=1
and, due to the fact that the intersection property is not satisﬁed, v(M1 ∪ M2\{i})=1f o r
all i ∈ M1 ∪ M2. Obviously, Core(v)=∅.S o ,( ( M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) is not balanced.
Assume (ii) holds. Let G =( V,E) be the graph with V = A1 and the edge set E deﬁned
8by (a,b) ∈ E if a,b ∈ V,S1(a) ∩ S1(b)  = ∅. The graph G consists of several connected
components that partition A1 in a natural way. Let {B1,B 2,...,Bk} be this partition. Hence,
if a,b ∈ Bj for some j ∈{ 1,...,k} then there exists a path from a to b. A similar partition can
be constructed for A2.S i n c e( ( M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) does not satisfy the partitioning




S1(a)=∅. Now, one of the following two cases is satisﬁed:
(α) for all a1,a 2 ∈ Bj,a1  = a2,i th o l d sS1(a1) ∩ S1(a2)  = ∅,
(β) there exists a1,a 2 ∈ Bj,a1  = a2,w i t hS1(a1) ∩ S1(a2)=∅.
If case (α) holds, we deﬁne the reward matrix R by Rab =1f o ra l la ∈ Bj,b ∈ A2 and
Rab = 0 otherwise. Since
 
a∈Bj
S1(a)=∅, Bj contains at least two objects. Hence, we can
conclude, similarly to case (i), that v(M1∪M2)=v((M1∪M2)\{i}) = 1 for all i ∈ M1∪M2.
Hence, Core(v)=∅.S o ,( ( M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) is not balanced.
If case (β) holds, observe that there exists c1,c 2,c 3 ∈ Bj such that S1(c1)∩S1(c2)=∅,S 1(c1)∩
S1(c3)  = ∅ and S1(c2)∩S1(c3)  = ∅. This observation holds by the following argument. Recall
that Bj is a connected component of the graph G. Because S1(a1) ∩ S1(a2)=∅ for some
a1,a 2 ∈ Bj,a 1  = a2, the graph is not complete. Hence, there is a path of length two in
G. The vertices on this path satisfy the required property. According to assumption (ii)
there are b1,b 2 ∈ A2 with S2(b1) ∩ S2(b2)=∅. Now, we deﬁne the matrix R by Rab =1
if (a,b) ∈{ (c1,b 1),(c2,b 1),(c3,b 2)} and Rab = 0 otherwise. Obviously, v(M1 ∪ M2)=1
because S1(c1) ∩ S1(c3)  = ∅ and S1(c2) ∩ S1(c3)  = ∅. Because S2(b1) ∩ S2(b2)=∅ and
S1(c1) ∩ S1(c2)=∅ we also have for all i ∈ M1 ∪ M2 that v((M1 ∪ M2)\{i}) = 1. Hence, we
conclude that Core(v)=∅.S o ,( ( M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) is not balanced. 
4 k-AMO games
In this section we discuss k-AMO games, relaxations of simple assignment games. We provide
suﬃcient conditions for balancedness of k-AMO games. First we will introduce the class of
k-AMO games.
Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO. A matching µ in B1(T1) × B2(T2) is called k-
admissible for coalition T1∪T2 if for any k+1 pairwise distinct pairs (a1,b 1),...,(ak+1,b k+1) ∈






S(bi)=∅. Observe that the restriction to k-admissible
matchings implies that a player that owns more than k objects can assign at most k objects.
The set of k-admissible matchings with respect to a coalition T1 ∪ T2 is denoted by
Ak(T1 ∪ T2). Note that Ak(T1 ∪ T2) ⊂A k+1(T1 ∪ T2), for all k ∈ IN and for all T1 ∪ T2.
Obviously, A1(T1 ∪ T2)=A(T1 ∪ T2) for all T1 ∪ T2 ⊂ M1 ∪ M2.
Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO and let R be a non-negative reward matrix.
The corresponding k-AMO game (M1∪M2,v k) is deﬁned for all T1∪T2,w i t hT1 ⊂ M1,T 2 ⊂
M2 by
vk(T1 ∪ T2)=m a x {
 
(a,b)∈µ
Rab : µ ∈A k(T1 ∪ T2)}. (2)
Observe that a simple assignment game coincides with a 1-AMO game. The following
example shows a 2-AMO game.
Example 4.1 Consider the AMO of Example 2.1. Let (M1 ∪ M2,v 2) be the corresponding
2-AMO game and consider coalition {1,2,3,4}. In contrast to the simple assignment game
in Example 2.1 in the 2-AMO game the matching {(r1,c 1),(r2,c 2)} is admissible. It is readily
veriﬁed that v2({1,2,3,4})=4a n d( 2 ,2,0,0) ∈ Core(v2). 
Next, we will formulate (2) as an Integer Linear Programming problem. For every i ∈
M1 ∪M2, deﬁne the vector ei ∈ IR A1×A2 by eiab =1i fi ∈ S1(a)∪S2(b), a ∈ A1,b∈ A2,a n d
eiab = 0 otherwise. For every c ∈ A1∪A2, deﬁne the vector fc ∈ IR A1×A2 by fcab =1i fc = a or






⎦,w h e r ee consists of all vectors ei, i ∈ M1 ∪ M2 and f consists of all vectors
fc, c ∈ A1 ∪ A2.L e t T1 ⊂ M1,T 2 ⊂ M2. Deﬁne the vector pT1∪T2(k) ∈ IR M1∪M2 by
p
T1∪T2
i (k)=k if i ∈ T1 ∪ T2 and p
T1∪T2
i (k) = 0 otherwise, and deﬁne qT1∪T2 ∈ IR A1∪A2 by
qT1∪T2
a =1i fSi(a) ⊂ T1 ∪ T2 for some i ∈{ 1,2} and qT1∪T2
a = 0 otherwise. We deﬁne the





⎦. So, the j-th row of
uT1∪T2(k) corresponds to the j-th row of the matrix A, i.e., if the j-th row of uT1∪T2(k)
represents player i or object a, then also the j-th row of the matrix A represents player i
10or object a. Now, it is straightforward to verify that (2) is equivalent to the following ILP
problem:




subject to Ay ≤ u
T1∪T2(k),
yab ∈{ 0,1} for all a ∈ A1,b∈ A2.
Deng et al. (1999) introduced the class of combinatorial games. Let N be the ﬁnite set
of players and M be a ﬁnite set with cardinality n and m, respectively. A combinatorial
game (N,vcom) is deﬁned for all S ⊂ N by




where B is a n × m {0,1}-matrix and 1S
i =1i fi ∈ S and 1S
i = 0 otherwise. Deng et al.
(1999) proved the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 (Deng et al. (1999))
A combinatorial game (N,vcom) is balanced if and only if the optimum of the ILP-problem
(4) of the grand coalition coincides with the optimum of its LP-relaxation.
It follows immediately that for k = 1 the ILP formulation (3) is a special case of the ILP
formulation of (4). Hence, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3 A simple assignment game is balanced if and only if the solution of the
ILP-problem (3) of the grand coalition coincides with the solution of its LP-relaxation.
Obviously, the result of Deng et al. (1999) can not be applied to k-AMO games for k ≥ 2
because the right-hand side vector in (3) is not a {0,1}-vector. Indeed, the following example
illustrates that the core of a k-AMO game can be non-empty although the ILP optimum
does not coincide with the optimum of its LP relaxation.


























Figure 2: An AMO with reward matrix R.
Then, for the corresponding 2-AMO game (M1 ∪M2,v 2)i th o l d sv2(M1 ∪M2)=2 ,w h i c hi s
the optimal solution of the ILP-problem (3) of the grand coalition. But the optimal solution
of the corresponding LP-relaxation is
8
3 which is larger than the worth of the grand coalition.





The following theorem shows that the coincidence of the optimum of the ILP-problem and
its relaxation is still a suﬃcient condition to have a balanced k-AMO game.
Theorem 4.5 Let ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) be an AMO and let R be a reward matrix.
Let (M1 ∪ M2,v k) be the corresponding k-AMO game. If the optimum of the ILP-problem
(3) of the grand coalition coincides with the optimum of its LP-relaxation, then the corre-
sponding k-AMO game is balanced.





subject to Ay ≤ u
T1∪T2(k),
y ≥ 0.







12where R =( Rab)a∈A1,b∈A2.L e t( M1 ∪ M2,v k) be the corresponding k-AMO game. By the
assumption in the theorem and the duality theorem of LP there exists an optimal solution z∗
of (6) such that vk(M1∪M2)=z∗T ·uM1∪M2(k). Now, we deﬁne the |M1|+|M2| dimensional
































































≥ vk(T1 ∪ T2),
where the last inequality holds because for any coalition the feasible region in the dual
problem (6) is identical. Hence, z∗ is a feasible solution (6) for T1 ∪ T2.E v i d e n t l y , f o r
M1 ∪ M2 all inequalities become equalities, which completes the proof. 
We conclude this section with two examples. They show that there is no relation between
the cores of consecutive k-AMO games.
Example 4.6 Figure 3 displays an AMO ((M1,M 2),(A1,A 2),(S1,S 2)) with reward matrix
R given by



































Figure 3: An AMO with reward matrix.
Let (M1 ∪M2,v 1) be the corresponding simple assignment game. Then v1(M1 ∪M2)=3
and the core is non-empty since for instance, (1,1,1,0,0,0) ∈ Core(v1). We now show that
Core(v2)=∅.
Let (M1 ∪ M2,v 2) be the corresponding 2-AMO game. Then v2({1,2,4,5})=3 ,
v2({1,3,4,6})=3 ,v2({2,3,5,6})=3a n dv2(M1∪M2) = 4. Suppose (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4,x 5,x 6) ∈
13Core(v2), then 8 = 2(x1 + x2 + ... + x6)=( x1 + x2 + x4 + x5)+( x1 + x3 + x4 + x6)+( x2 +
x3+x5+x6) ≥ v2({1,2,4,5})+v2({1,3,4,6})+v2({2,3,5,6})=9 , which is a contradiction.
Therefore, Core(v2)=∅.
Example 4.7 Recall that the AMO of Example 2.1 and Example 4.1 are identical. In Exam-
ple 2.1 it is shown that Core(v1)=∅, whereas in Example 4.1 it is shown that Core(v2)  = ∅.
Finally, we remark that k-AMO games, where k ≥ max{|A1|,|A2|}, are balanced, because
these games can be considered as a subgame of the assignment games of Shapley and Shubik
(1972) in which the objects are the players.
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